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IN THE SUPREI\tm COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CRAIG CALDWELL and ROBERT
E. COVINGTON,dba CALD-WELL ...
AND COVINGTON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants~
vs.
ANSCHUTZ DRILLING COMPANY, INC., a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

JlJNl
'-AvV

APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN ANSWER TO RESPONDENT'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Fourth Judicial District Court for Uintah County,
Hon. Joseph E. Nelson, Judge

F. ROBERT BAYLE and
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR OF
HURD, BAYLE & HURD
1105 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants

Young, Thatcher & Glasmann
1018 First Security Bank Building
Ogden, Utah
John C. Beaslin
Vernal, Utah
Holme, Roberts, More & Owen
1700 Broadway
Denver 2, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent
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~~r~ument ---------------------------------------------------------------------- I
Point !-Appellants were not required to prove
by clear and convincing evidence a case for specific
performance nor was specific performance a proper
issue to be determined on appeal based upon the
present state of the trial record. -------------------------------- I
Point 2-The Respondents, having made an offer
to the appellants, which offer was accepted, were
not permitted to orally extend the time for payment
of the earnest money, and then, when it was too late
to conform to the terms of the original contract,
refuse to abide by the ter1ns of the oral time extension. ----------------------···------------------------------------------------------- iJ
Point il-There is ample evidence to support this
court's finding that there was an offer to sign and
deliver the contract by appellant's agent. _________________ _ 5

Point 4-There was ample evidence on which a
finding could be based that the appellants offered to
sign the written contract and pay the earnest money
but their tender was refused. -------------------------------------Point 5-There was an offer to tender cash to the
Respondent which was refused by their Petitioner ...

6

Conclusion

8

7

CASES CITED
Brown Y. Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 9 Pac 57il,
II Pac 512 ----------------------···----------------------------------Cummings Y. Nielson, -:t2 Utah 157, I29 Pac 6I9..

8

In re McKnight, 4 Utah 2il7, 9 Pac 299 --·--···------------

8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
l,ALD,VELL and ROBERT
E.l~O,TINGTON,dba CALDWELL
AND COVING'fON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants~

l,lt~\1(~

vs.

No.
9587

ANSCHUTZ DitiLLING COMl>ANY, INC., a corporation,
Defendant and Resp_ondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEf4' IN ANSWER TO RESPONDENT'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING .AND SUPPORTING BRmF

The appellants, having heretofore set forth the
facts in their brief on appeal, will confine this brief to
ans,vering the points raised by respondent's petition for
rehearing.
POINT I
.l\.PPELLANTS WERE NOT REQUIRED
TO PRO,TE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
E'TIDEXCE A CASE FOR SPECIFIC PERl
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FORMANCE NOR 'VAS SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE A PROPER ISSUE TO BE DETERMINED ON APPEAL BASED UPON
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE TRIAL
RECORD.
This Court's opinion of April 3, 1962, and the
determination of issues therein, aptly and adequately
disposes of all material issues raised on appeal. The
petitioner raises issues not supported by the trial record,
in its present state, and has not made a showing that
a material issue remains unresolved. 'l"he respondent
suggests in its brief that this Court has failed to rule
upon the issue of specific performance. It is respectfully submitted that until the issues of fact have been
determined by a jury, the question of specific performance is not material. Certainly counsel for petitioner
must be aware of the time-honored rule of law that
land and interest therein, being unique, are the proper
subject of specific performance.
Without submitting repetitious argument and
authorities, it is respectfully suggested that this Honorable Court correctly refused to further burden
itself with issues immaterial to a proper determination
of the case. Petitioner further claims at page 2 of its
brief, that this Court should have applied the rule requiring "clear and convincing" proof by the appellants.
The cases referred to by petitioner at pages 21 and 22
of its Brief on Appeal clearly indicate that the facts
are in no way similar to those in the instant case. Peti-
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tioner has cited cases wherein it was alleged that an
"oral contract" existed for the conveyance of real
property. In the instant case, it is clear by the contract
received in evidence that the parties' agreement was
reduced to \vri ting and in fact signed by the petitioner.

POINT II
THE RESPONDENTS, HAVING MADE
r\N 0~-,:F'ER '1"'0 TilE APPELLANTS, WHICH
OFFER WAS A.CCEPTED, 'VERE NOT PERl\IITTED TO ORALLY EXTEND THE TIME
FOR PAYMENT OF 'THE EARNEST MONEY,
AND THEN, 'iVHEN IT WAS TOO LA'l,E TO
CONFORM TO 'l,HE 'TERMS OF THE ORIGINAL C.ONTRAC'f, REFUSE '1'0 ABIDE BY
THE TER~IS OF 'THE ORAL TIME EX TENSION.
The contract offer and price had been in fact accepted by the appellants and there remained only the
matter of payment. Petitioner continues to treat the
facts of the case as ii1dicating a n1ere offer that had
never been accepted. The facts, as presented, by the
appellants, clearly show that there was a contract reduced to writing and in fact accepted.

' T·

The affidavit of
,V. "\tVakefield, a 'rice-President of the Petitioner, clearly shows that at no time
did the Petitioner withdraw its offer to the appellants
until after it had refused to accept the appellants'
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tender of payment. See paragraph 2 of Mr. Wakefield's
affidavit on file herein wherein he stated: "Mr. H. 0.
Lynch, President of Anschutz Drilling Company, Inc.,
instructed me to accept Mr. Alloway's personal check
if it were certified. Mr. Lynch then left the office."
'fhis affidavit, filed by the Petitioner in support
of its motion for summary judgment, clearly shows
that its offer had been accepted and the time for payment was the only matter in dispute. See also the
affidavit filed by Dennis R. Drake, an ·employee of
the Petitioner, "\\'"herein he states, in paragraph 2: "On
·February 16, 1961, 1\tlr. Craig Caldwell, one of the
plaintiffs in this matter, telephoned and spoke to me
and Mr. H. 0. Lynch, President of Anschutz Drilling
Company, Inc.; Mr. Caldwell stated that he would
purchase the subject acreage of this action at the price
of $1.25 per acre. Mr. Caldwell agreed to put up one
quarter of the total purchase price as earnest money. He
stated that Anschutz Drilling Company_, Inc., draw up
a contract and 1nail it to hi'm.-'-' (Italics ours).
See also the affidavit of Mr. H. 0. Lynch, President
of the Petitioner company, wherein he states in paragraph 2: uMr. Caldwell stated that he would purchase
the subject acreage of this action and a cased well in
the Horseshoe Bend Block for $1.25 per acre and
$3,250.00 for the UJell. He asked that Anschutz Drilling
Company, Inc., draw 1~;p a co·ntract and mail it to him.''
( Italics ours) .
Then again in paragraph 5 of Mr. Lynch's affi4
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davit, he states: "I advised Mr. Alloway that the check
\Vas not acceptable because it was not certified as required by the contract. Mr. Alloway stated that he
\\·ould get the check certified and return with it. I then
authorized 1\lr. \\T. \ V. Wakefield, Vice President of
.t\nschutz Drilling Company, Inc., to accept the check
if it were properly certified. I then left the offices of
Anschutz Drilling Company, Inc., and did not return
the rest of the day of February 24, 1961."
'l.,he facts clearly show as evidenced by testimony
and affidavits filed by the petitioner that its offer had
been accepted and that it tried to evade acceptance of
payment. The affidavits further indicate that the petitioner recognized the necessity of accepting payment by
certified check if the same, could have been procured by
nlr. Alloway, as Mr. Lynch so instructed Mr. \V akefield.

POIN'f 3
THERE IS Al\1PLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS COURT'S FINDING 'f HAT
THERE
AS AN O:F,FER TO SIGN AND DELI\TER THE CONTRAC'l., BY APPELLANTS'
AGENT.

''r

The record clearly shows that those representing
the petitioner consider the offer as having been accepted.
c·ounsel for petitioner continually refers to the contract
as "alleged contract" and "proposed written contract."
5
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The contract was reduced to writing and in fact introduced in evidence.
Petitioner also continues its effort to mislead this
Court by stating that there was no evidence to indicate
an acceptance of the terms of the contract by the appellants. A review of the testimony and affidavits, which,
it must be noted, were filed by the Petitioner, clearly
indicate that the seller had considered that terms were
agreed to by the parties and that acceptance had been
made with nothing remaining but payment of the earnest
money.

POINT 4
THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE ON
WHICH A FINDING COULD BE BASED
THAT THE APPELLANTS OFFERED TO
SIGN THE WRITTEN CON'TRACT AND PAY
THE EARNEST MONEY BUT THEIR TENDER WAS REFUSED.
As set forth in appellants' Brief on Appeal, and
also noted at page 8 of respondent's brief supporting
its petition for rehearing, it appears clear from the testimony of Mr. Alloway that he was ready, willing and
able to sign the contract and his offer was refused. It
should be also noted that on page 10 of respondent's
brief on rehearing, the testimony of Mr. Alloway is
clearly to the effect that he offered to deliver cash to
the respondent but the same was refused.
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POIN1, 5
'fHERE \\r AS AN OI~.,FER TO '!,ENDER
l~ASII '1,0 'l,IIE RESPONDENT -WHICH WAS
REFUSED B\T 'l,HE PE'l,l'l,IONER.
'l,he testin1ony of Mr. Alloway is clear that he told
~lr. Lynch that he would sign the contract for the
appellants. l\)unsel for petitioner continually refers to
the contract as an ~~unsigned contract." Perhaps counsel
has overlooked the fact that petitioner signed the contract before it was mailed to appellants.
The trial record, coupled with the affidavits filed
by the employees· and officers of the respondent corporation, aptly demonstrates that there was a meeting
of the minds as between the parties. The offer to sell
by the respondent had in fact been accepted by the
appellants and there remained only payment of the
earnest money. Appellants maintain that a time extension for payment was granted by the respondent. Even
respondent admits that a time extension was orally
granted for this payment. The only dispute between
the parties at this poii1t is the amount of time extended
to the appellants in which to deliver the earnest money
to the respondent. This is an issue of fact, to be determined by a jury, and this Honorable Court has so held
in its opinion. Appellants will not belabor the point by
repetitious argument on issues already fully decided
by this Court.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the petition for
rehearing should be denied, as there is nothing presented
by petitioner to justify a rehearing under the decisions
of this Court. In re McKnight, 4 Utah 237, 9 P 299;
Brown vs. Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 9 Pac. 573, 11 Pac.
512; Cummings vs. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619.
Respectfully submitted,

F. ROBERT BAYLE and
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR of
HURD, BAYLE & HURD
1105 Continental Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
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